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Authoritarianism in Latin America 1990-20141 
 
JAROSLAV BÍLEK 
(University Hradec Králové) 
 
 Introduction 
 
 Even though the international political situation in the post-cold war 
world makes it much more difficult for fully authoritarian regimes to get 
established, we can't say that in the wake of the third democratic wave, all 
forms of authoritarianism would disappear completely. The very specific 
constellation of the international political situation led to the creation of 
competitive authoritarianism, in which democratic institutions exist but 
incumbent abuse skews the playing field against the opponents2. Due to the 
relatively frequent occurrence of these regimes, competitive authoritarianism 
has become a major focus of comparative research. Besides the question of 
regime stability3, the interest of researchers has mostly been aimed at the effort 
to explain how and when the incumbent can be defeated4 and what affects the 
level of electoral competitiveness5. Although the conclusions of these studies 
have been undeniably interesting, we also need to address some of the 
                                                 
1
  Support for this article was provided by the grant Research of Latin American Politics II 
by the Philosophical Faculty of University of Hradec Králové. 
2
  Steven Levitsky, James Loxton, “Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the 
Andes”, Democratization, vol. 20, no. 1, 2013, pp. 107-136. 
3
  Jason Browlee, “Portens of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic 
Transitions”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 53, no. 3, 2009, pp. 515-532; 
Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the 
Cold War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010. 
4
  Marc M. Howard, Philip G. Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive 
Authoritarian Regimes”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 50, no. 2, 2006, 
pp. 362-378; Kenneth Green, “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party 
Dominance”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 43, no. 7, 2010, pp. 807-834; 
Valerie Bunce, Sharon Wolchick, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist 
Countries, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011; Daniela Donno, “Elections and 
Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes”, American Journal of Political Science, 
vol. 57, no. 3, 2013, pp. 703-716. 
5
  Leah Gilbert, State Mobilization Strategies and Political Competition in Hybrid Regimes, 
Georgetown University, Washington DC, 2012; Andreas Schedler, The Politics of 
Uncertainty. Substaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism, Oxford University 
Press, 2013.  
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limitations of the contemporary research on competitive authoritarianism. As 
has been pointed out by some authors in the past6, there is a certain shortcoming 
of the existing research in the fact that it draws data mainly from large-N 
comparative studies. Because of these parameters, the character of our theories 
is rather universal, with a fairly limited explanatory potential. A feasible 
solution to this situation is to steer our attention to small-to-medium-N 
comparisons, which – thanks to closer interaction with data – can help improve 
the explanatory ability7. Another flaw of the existing research is that the large-N 
comparative studies mostly focus on older (and relatively well-known) 
examples, omitting many contemporary cases of competitive authoritarianism. 
A good example of such practice is Latin America, where, in the past ten years, 
competitive authoritarian regimes have been established in several countries 
(Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua), but so far, these cases haven’t 
received a lot of scientific attention. 
 The aim of this study is to react to this situation and offer an 
explanation of varying degree of electoral competitiveness in competitive 
authoritarianism in Latin America. For that purpose, this study compares the 41 
cases of elections that were carried out between 1990 and 20148, using 
regression analysis and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)9. This paper 
takes up the research tradition of setting the goal of explaining variation within 
one specific regime category. Furthermore, the study tries to use data from the 
newly accessible database Varieties of Democracy10, which so far hasn't been 
used for research on elections in competitive authoritarianism and contains an 
abundance of variables linked to elections in hybrid regimes. However, the 
comparative research of competitive authoritarianism in Latin America isn’t 
insightful only from the theoretical point of view, but also from the practical 
one, as elections have been recently held in some of these regimes and are going 
to be held in several others over the course of the next two years11. It is 
                                                 
6
  Jennifer Gandhi, Elenn Lust-Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism”, Annual Review of 
Political Science, vol. 12, no.1, 2009, pp. 403-422; Yonatan L. Morse, “The Era of 
Electoral Authoritarianism”, World Politics, vol. 61, no. 1, 2012, pp. 161-198. 
7
  Yanatan L. Morse, “The Era of Electoral…cit.”, p. 189. 
8
  The 2014 elections are not a part of this study, because to a big extent, it works with data 
from Varieties of Democracy, whose dataset ends with 2014. 
9
  Charles Ragin, Sean Davey, fs/QCA (computer programme), version 2.5, University of 
California, Irvine CA, 2014. 
10
  Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, 
David Altman et al. “V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v6.2”, Varieties of 
Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2016. 
11
  Elections in Nicaragua have been carried out at the end of last year and in Ecuador, they 
should take place at the beginning of this year. In Venezuela, the elections are planned for 
2018 and in Bolivia for 2019. As for Venezuela, it’s a question whether the opposition 
will manage to make the sitting president call an early presidential election before the end 
of his regular presidential term. 
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therefore of high importance to know which factors affect the chances of the 
opposition for success. 
 This article has several important implications for the comparative 
research on competitive authoritarianism. First, it undermines the value of the 
natural resources rent and economic statism variables. Although previously, 
scholars have assumed these factors to have an influence on the level of 
electoral competitiveness, findings of this research do not confirm this 
assumption. Second, contrary to the older research by Schedler12, this article 
concludes that some repressive strategies adopted by governments have had a 
statistically significant impact on the scope of electoral competitiveness. This is 
interesting when considering that previously, this strategy appeared to be 
influential only in the case of hegemonic electoral regimes. Third, the empirical 
part of this article suggests that in the majority of cases the different level of electoral 
competitiveness can be explained by a relatively small number of variables. 
 
 
 Theories and Hypotheses 
 
 What is influencing the level of electoral competitiveness in 
competitive authoritarianism? Based on a survey of the literature about elections 
in competitive authoritarianism13, this study came with 17 potential 
explanations which can be divided into the following three main categories. 
This account is obviously not an exhaustive one. Its purpose is rather to ensure a 
balance and to employ the widest array of data from the aforementioned 
Varieties of Democracy (V-dem) database14.  
 The first category includes the socio-economic kinds of explanation15. 
The first of them is based on the legendary work of Seymour Martin Lipset16, 
                                                 
12
  Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty. Substaining and Subverting Electoral 
Authoritarianism, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
13
  The backbone of the mentioned literary survey consisted of publications highlighted in the 
introduction. 
14
  The majority of variables in V-dem dataset is in 0-4 values, where 0 is the most negative 
and 4 the most positive value. For the purpose of analysis in this study these variables are 
reversed. The only exception is the variable “political corruption”, as this variable is 
coded in 0-1 values, where 0 is the most positive and 1 the most corrupt. The final value 
of all the variables is derived from the average of the values two years before the 
elections. 
15
  Data for socio-economical variables mainly comes from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/, accessed on 20.8.2016). The final 
value of all the variables is derived from the average of the values two years before the 
elections. 
16
  Seymour M. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy”, American Political Science Review, vol. 53, no. 1, 1959, pp. 69-103. 
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which follows economic development17. According to this theory, there is a 
proportional relationship between economic development and electoral 
competitiveness. The second explanation is focused on short-term economic 
performances18. This point of view suggests that the growth of GDP should 
raise the chances of the incumbents of being re-elected and hence reduce the 
level of electoral competitiveness19. The third kind of socio-economic 
explanation is concerned with the amount of state ownership in the economy20. 
A high level of nationalization and state regulations increase the power of the 
ruling party and vice versa21. The fourth explanation is attentive to the level of 
social inequality22. According to some scholars23, the level of inequality affects 
the degree of citizens’ participation on political issues. In line with this 
argument, in countries with high inequality, this leads to lower interest of 
citizens in politics and decreases the political competition. The fifth explanation 
highlights the role of the mineral rents24 25.  
 
 “Where fuel or mineral exports generate massive state revenue, state-society 
resource asymmetries may enable governments to co-opt civil society and starve the 
opponents of resources.”26 
 
 The very last explanation is concentrated on international and global 
factors. The high level of linkage and dependence27 on the international system 
is expected to be reflected in the quality of domestic political competition28.  
                                                 
17
  Economic development is operationalized as GDP per capita in USD in the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) dataset. 
18
  This variable is operationalized as GDP per capita growth in USD in WGI dataset. 
19
  Stephen Haggard, Robert R. Kaufman. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995. 
20
  This variable is operationalized as State ownership of economy in Varieties of Democracy 
dataset. 
21
  Kenneth Green, “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance”, 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 43, no. 7, 2010, pp. 807-834; Kurt Weyland, “Latin 
America’s Authoritarian Drift. The Threat from Populist Left“, Journal of Democracy, 
vol. 24, no. 3, 2013, pp. 18-32. 
22
  Social inequality is operationalized as the GINI index in the WGI dataset. 
23
  Guillermo O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability and New Polyarchies”, Working Paper 
of Kellogg Institute, no. 253, 1998; Wolfgang Merkel “Embedded and Defective 
Democracies”, Democratization, vol. 11, no. 5, 2004, pp. 33-58. 
24
  Mineral rents are operationalized as Total natural resorces rent (% GDP) in the WGI 
dataset. 
25
  Michael W. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”, World Politics, vol. 53, no. 3, 2001, 
pp. 325-361. 
26
  Steven Levitsky, James Loxton, “Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism...cit.”. 
27
  This variable is operationalized as international trade (% GDP) in the WGI dataset. 
28
  Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism...cit. 
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 The second category includes institutional explanations29. The first 
explanation focuses on the level of corruption30. High level of corruption may 
increase electoral competitiveness, “because it undercuts the ability of leaders to 
maintain their patronage networks”31. The second explanation in this category is 
based on the legislative strength32. This explanation is driven by the assumption 
that: 
 
 “Imbalances in executive-legislative relations should find almost direct 
expressions in electoral imbalances. In the absence of legislative checks and balances, 
overpowering executives should find it  comparatively easy  to manufacture wide margins 
of victory”33. 
 
 Another explanation follows the number of electoral cycles34 without 
alternation of power. Unfortunately we have mixed assumptions about causal 
effect of this variable. Some scholars argue that high number of electoral cycles 
without alternation of power can decrease electoral competitiveness35 and other 
scholars oppose this statement36. The last institutional factor which can affect 
electoral competitiveness in competitive authoritarianism is the timing of the 
presidential and parliamentary elections. Predictions about the effect of the 
concurrent elections are again uncertain. Moreover, in his recent research, 
Schedler revealed that the level of electoral competitiveness does not vary 
between concurrent and non-concurrent elections37. 
 The third and fourth category of the potential explanations are based 
around actors. The third category includes strategic decisions of the 
government. On the side of the government, we can talk about different types of 
repression which can decrease electoral competitiveness, like censorship of 
                                                 
29
  I choose not to include two of the most used institutional explanations: the difference 
between the presidential and parliamentary regime and incumbent participation in 
elections. I decided so because of the specific context of the examined field. The first 
explanation lacks any meaning in this study, because all regimes are presidential. The re-
election of presidential candidate is problematic due to a combination of presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Moreover, in many cases, presidential re-election is forbidden 
(Mexico, Paraguay, Guatemala). 
30
  The level of corruption is operationalized as political corruption in the V-Dem dataset. 
31
  Valerie Bunce, Sharon Wolchick, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders...cit, p. 40. 
32
  Legislative strenght is operationalized as Legislative constraints on the executive index in 
the V-Dem dataset. 
33
  Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty...cit., p. 238. 
34
  This variable is operationalized as the number of electoral cycles without alternation in 
power. 
35
  Ibidem. 
36
  Staffan I. Lindberg, Democratization by Elections. A New Mode of Transitions, John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2009. 
37
  Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty...cit., p. 236. 
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media38 and exclusion39 and intimidation of opposition40 41. The last explanation 
is concerned with freedom of civil society organizations. As Diamond noted:  
 
“While an opposition victory is not impossible in a hybrid regime, it requires a 
level of opposition  mobilization, unity, skills, and heroism far beyond what would 
normally be required for victory in a democracy”42. 
 
 In this (at least for opposition) unfortunate situation, one of the causes 
that can help is a strong presence of civil society organizations, which can again 
help to balance the power between the ruling party and the opposition43. If the 
ruling party wants to restrict this potential threat, it must keep these two groups 
divided44. In line with this argument, the degree of repression of civil society45 
organizations can affect competitiveness in competitive authoritarianism 
because if the degree of repression of civil society organization is high, the 
ruling party maintains its power more easily. 
 On the side of the opposition (the fourth category of potential 
explanations), recent research shows the importance of the ability of the 
opposition party to create a broad coalition before election46, more specifically 
unification of the main opposition forces around one candidate who can better 
challenge the candidate of the ruling party. In addition to other reasons, a united 
opposition can better mobilize people to vote against the incumbent, as the 
electorate feels that the change is possible and the people begin to see the 
opposition as an alternative governing coalition. A different and more radical 
strategy of the opposition is electoral boycott47, which obviously decreases the 
electoral competition. The last and slightly less radical opposition strategy is 
                                                 
38
  Censorship of media is operationalized as value of Government censorship effort – Media 
index in the V-dem dataset.  
39
  Exclusion is operationalized as value of party ban variable in the V-Dem dataset. 
40
  This variable is operationalized as value of Election government intimidation variable in 
the V-Dem dataset. 
41
  Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty...cit. 
42  Larry Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes“, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, 
no. 2, 2001, p. 24. 
43
  Steven M. Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian 
Revolution, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995. 
44
  Valerie Bunce, Sharon Wolchick, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders...cit, p. 60. 
45
  Civil society freedom is operationalized as CSO repression in the V-dem dataset. 
46
  Oppositon coalition is operationalized as dichotomous variable which has to cover the 
level of opposition cohesion. 1 = broad coalition of opposition forces or partial coalition 
of opposition forces, 0 = minority coalition of opposition forces or opposition forces are 
divided. The data for this variable comes from secondary literature about the cases. A list 
of sources is available upon request. 
47
  Electoral boycott is operationalized as Election boycotts in the V-dem dataset. 
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organizing pre-electoral protests48. This strategy should help mobilize voters 
and lead to increased electoral competitiveness49. 
 
 
Measuring Competitive Authoritarianism  
and Electoral Competitiveness 
 
For the purpose of this study  
 
“competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic 
institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in 
which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis 
their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic 
institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the 
playing field is heavily skewed in favor of the incumbents”50. 
 
Regimes that combine elements of democracy and authoritarianism are 
not new to political science and this phenomenon has already been 
conceptualized by a number of other authors51. However, what sets competitive 
authoritarianism apart from the rest of the multifarious family of hybrid regimes 
is the fact that in this particular kind of regime, the playing field is heavily 
skewed in favor of the incumbents. Therefore, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way 
conceptualize only one of the possible categories of hybrid regimes. In the 
context of Latin America, it is necessary to also mention the conception of Scott 
Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks and Aníbal Pérez-Liňán52. Their work on semi-
democratic regimes aims at encompassing a significantly broader category of 
political regimes between democracy and authoritarianism, such as those where 
army has a considerable influence over politics53. 
                                                 
48
  Electoral protests are operationalized as the number of riots in Phil A. Neel Counting 
Riots database (http://www.ultra-com.org/project/counting-riots/, accessed on 20.8.2016). 
The final value of all the variables is derived from the average of the values two years 
before the elections. 
49  Marc M. Howard, Philip G. Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes...cit.”, pp. 371-372. 
50
  Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism...cit., p. 5. 
51
  For a review of this literature see Vladimíra Dvořáková, Radek Buben, Jan Němec, ¡Que 
el pueblo mande!, Sociologické nakladatelství, Praha, 2012. 
52
  Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, Aníbal Peréz-Liňán, “Classifying Political Regimes in 
Latin America, 1945-1999”, Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 36, 
no. 1, 2001, pp. 37-65. 
53
  For more details about the differences between various types of hybrid regimes, see 
Jaroslav Bílek, “Hybrid Regimes as an Independent Type of Political Regime: A 
Comparison of Selected Approaches”, Central European Political Studies Review, 
vol. 17, no. 2, 2015, pp. 212-233. 
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The classification of political regimes in a grey zone54 for the purpose 
of the multiple-case study is always fairly tricky. Basically, there are three 
possible approaches to the problem. First, the composite score, such as those 
from Freedom House or Polity IV, can be used. However, one potential pitfall 
of this approach lies in the fact that the aggregate-level evaluations are not 
useful for the classification of hybrid regimes55, because they cannot capture the 
variability of these regimes in a satisfactory way. According to the recent study 
of Samuel Handlin56, the limits of those evaluations are reflected in their 
inability to differentiate between democracy and competitive authoritarianism. 
This problem has much to do with the specific nature of these regimes, above 
all with their inofficial practices that cannot be easily detected by aggregate-
level quantitative evaluations. Second, the in-depth qualitative classification on 
the basis of precisely established criteria is another way for distinguishing this 
type of regimes. However, within this approach, it is quite difficult to retain 
consistency across a greater number of cases.  
For these reasons, this study opts for the third approach, which is 
recommended by Andrea Cassani57. It suggests to consider a regime to be 
competitive authoritarianism only in case that it was classified like this by other 
authors, which reflects the prevalence of a consensus among researchers. For 
this purpose, I have explored the works of different authors58 who have dealt 
                                                 
54
  Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, 
no. 1, 2002, pp. 5-21. 
55
  Leah Gilbert, Payam Mosheni, “Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of 
Hybrid Regimes”, Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 46, no. 3, 
2011, pp. 270-297; Geraldo G. Munck, Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing and Measuring 
Democracy“, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 35, no. 1, 2002, pp. 5-34; 
Alex Hadenius, Jay Teorell, Authoritarian Regimes: Stability, Change, and Pathways to 
Democracy, 1972-2003, Working Paper #331, 2006. 
56
  Samuel Handlin, “Observing Incumbent Abuses: Improving Measures of Electoral and 
Competitive Authoritarianism with New Data“, Democratization, vol. 24, no. 1, 2016, 
pp. 1-29. 
57
  Andrea Cassani, “Hybrid What? Partial Consensus and Persistent Divergence in the 
Analysis of Hybrid Regimes“, International Political Science Review, vol. 35, no. 2, 
2014, pp. 542-558. 
58
  Larry Diamond, “Thinking About...cit.”; Idem, “Is Democracy in Decline?”, Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 26, no. 1, 2015, pp. 141-155; Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way, Competitive 
Authoritarianism...cit.; Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way, “The Myth of Democratic 
Recession”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 26, no. 1, 2015, pp. 46-58; Marc M. Howard, 
Philip G. Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes...cit.”; Daniela Donno, “Elections 
and Democratization...cit.”; Steven Levitsky, James Loxton, “Populism and Competitive 
Authoritarianism...cit.”; Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty...cit.; Kurt Weyland, 
“Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift...cit.”; Scott Mainwaring, Anibál Peréz-Liňán, 
Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America. Emergence, Survival and Fall, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013; Idem, “Cross-Currents in Latin America”, 
Journal of Democracy, vol. 26, no. 1, 2015, pp. 114-127. 
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with the issue of competitive authoritarian regimes in Latin America in the time 
period used in this study. The results can be seen in Table 1. Its form ‒ 
introducing respective parliamentary and presidential elections ‒ is determined 
by the focus of the study, assuming elections as a unit of analysis. 
 
Table 1 
Cases of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Previous Studies 
Case  Diamond LevWay HowRoess Donno LevLox Schedler Weyland ML 
Bo06L I I     I I I   
Bo09P I I     I I I   
Bo09L I I     I I I   
Bo14P I I     I I I   
Bo14L I I     I I I   
Co02P           I     
Dr90P   I             
Dr90L   I             
Dr94P   I             
Dr94L   I             
Dr96P     I I         
Dr96L     I I         
Ec06P         I       
Ec07L I I     I I I   
Ec09P I I     I I I   
Ec09L I I     I I I   
Ec13P I I     I I I   
Ec13L I I     I I I   
Gu95P     I     I     
Gu95L     I     I     
Ha95P   I   I   I     
Ha95L   I   I   I     
Ha00P I I       I     
Ha00L I I       I     
Me91L   I I I         
Me94P   I I I         
Me94L   I I I         
Me97L       I         
Me00P       I         
Me00L       I         
Ni90P   I I I         
Ni90L   I I I         
Ni11P I I       I I I 
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Ni11L I I       I I I 
Pe92L   I     I   I I 
Pe95P   I I I I I I I 
Pe95L   I I I I I I I 
Pe00P   I I I I I I I 
Pe00L   I I I I I I I 
Pe01P     I I         
Pe01L     I I         
Pa91L   I   I         
Pa93P   I   I         
Pa93L   I   I         
Pa98P   I       I     
Pa98L   I       I     
Ve00P             I   
Ve00L             I   
Ve05L I       I I I I 
Ve06P I       I I I I 
Ve10L I       I I I I 
Ve12P I       I I I I 
Ve13P I             I 
Note: Ve(Venezuela), Pa(Paraguay), Pe(Peru), Ni(Nicaragua), Ha(Haiti), Ec(Ecuador), 
Dr(Dominican Republic), Bo(Bolivia), Co(Colombia), Me(Mexico), Gu(Guatemala).  
L= Legislative Elections. P= presidential election. 
 
Although the conclusions of this analysis are limited, since the authors 
usually did not analyze exactly the same period of time and because the analysis 
covers only comparative studies of more cases, the presented results are 
interesting for both the case selection in this study and the assessment of the 
current state of research of hybrid regimes. In Table 1, we can see the absence 
of consensus among researchers regarding some specific cases. On one hand, 
there are clear-cut cases which are unanimously classified in a certain way, such 
as Fujimori’s Peru. On the other hand, there are also “ambiguous” disputed 
cases such as Dominican Republic or Paraguay. In general, we can conclude 
that the level of agreement among the authors is rising over time, which in fact 
means that among researchers, there is a wider consensus with respect to 
contemporary cases than regarding the regimes of the 90s.  
In the search for the required minimal level of consensus, the study 
includes only the cases that were classified as hybrid regimes at least in three 
out of the eight used sources. Although this number seems too permissive at a 
first glance, if we consider the different time of origin and often very different 
empirical scope of the texts, it is quite justifiable. This criteria applied, we 
Electoral Competitiveness in Competitive Authoritarianism 341 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVII  no. 2  2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
acquire 30 cases of elections, a number which is supposed to be rather reliable. 
The fact that these are rather clear-cut cases increases the validity of the results 
acquired, because it compensates the requirement of classic statistical studies to 
use a much greater number of cases to reach representativity. Moreover, to 
ensure a much larger validity, the regimes that are agreed on by at least two 
studies are also included as a control sample. This control sample contains 
exactly 41 cases. 
 
    Table 2 
Universe of Cases of Elections in Competitive Authoritarianism 
in Latin America 1990-2014 
Sample 1 Control sample 
Bo06L Me94P Bo06L Ha95L Pe01P 
Bo09P Me94L Bo09P Ha00P Pe01L 
Bo09L Ni90P Bo09L Ha00L Pa91L 
Bo14P Ni90L Bo14P Me91L Pa93P 
Bo14L Ni11P Bo14L Me94P Pa93L 
Ec07L Ni11L Dr96P Me94L Pa98P 
Ec09P Pe92L Dr96L Ni90P Pa98L 
Ec09L Pe95P Ec07L Ni90L Ve05L 
Ec13P Pe95L Ec09P Ni11P Ve06P 
Ec13L Pe00P Ec09L Ni11L Ve10L 
Ha95P Pe00L Ec13P Pe92L Ve12P 
Ha95L Ve05L Ec13L Pe95P Ve13P 
Ha00P Ve06P Gu95P Pe95L   
Ha00L Ve10L Gu95L Pe00P   
Me91L Ve12P Ha95P Pe00L   
Note: Ve(Venezuela), Pa(Paraguay), Pe(Peru), Ni(Nicaragua), Ha(Haiti),  
Ec(Ecuador), Dr(Dominican Republic), Bo(Bolivia), Co(Colombia),  
Me(Mexico), Gu(Guatemala).  
L= Legislative Elections. P= presidential election. 
 
The dependent variable of the study ‒ electoral competitiveness ‒ is 
defined as margins of victory in competitive authoritarian regimes. Margins of 
victory (how close the electoral result was) are usually used as a measure of 
electoral competitiveness in similar studies59. In this study, margins of victory 
are operationalized as a difference in seat shares between the largest and the 
                                                 
59
  Leah Gilbert, State Mobilization Strategies...cit.; Andreas Schedler, The Politics of 
Uncertainty...cit.  
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second-largest party in legislative elections. Margins of victory in presidential 
elections are then defined as the difference in valid vote shares between the 
winning candidate and the one who finished second in the first round of 
presidential elections. I suppose that the larger the margins of victory, the 
smaller the electoral competitiveness in the respective elections. In an effort to 
compare the results with other studies, the classification used in this study is 
identical to the one used by Schedler in his work60. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Being an Empirical analysis, this study uses regression analysis and QCA. 
The QCA is a tool for systematic comparison of the cases. The QCA belongs to the 
family of the set-theoretic data analysis techniques that are “concerned with the 
systematic matching and contrasting of the cases to establish common causal 
relationships by eliminating all other possibilities”61. The whole category of QCA 
methods was originally introduced by Charles Ragin62. These research methods 
contain elements of qualitative and quantitative approaches, but in essence use case-
sensitive approach63 because QCA has strong qualitative roots64.  
The regression analysis and set-theoretic methods are not combined too 
often, although it is one of the possible ways of triangulation65. There are two 
approaches which differ in view on this problem. The first is a purist approach, 
which argues that regression analysis and set-theoretic methods cannot properly 
be used together, because both methods differ epistemologically. This study is 
based on a second (pragmatic) approach, which argues that the epistemological 
differences are an advantage rather than a drawback, as this allows for two 
distinct but hopefully complementary points of view of the same research 
question66. 
                                                 
60
  Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty...cit., p. 207. 
61
  Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Gisele De Meur, Benoít Rihoux, Charles Ragin, “Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) as an Approach”, in Benoít Rihoux, Charles Ragin, 
Configurational Comparative Methods. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and 
Related Techniques, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, 2009, pp. 1-18. 
62
  Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 
Strategies, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1989. 
63
  Benoít Rihoux, “Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Systematic 
Comparative Methods”, International Sociology, vol. 21, no. 5, 2006, pp. 679-706. 
64
  Claudius Wagemann, Carstern Q. Schneider, Set-Theoretic Methods for Social Science. A 
Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012. 
65
  Svend-Erik Skaaning, “Explaining Post-Communist Respect for Civil Liberty: A Multi-
Methods Test“, Journal of Business Research, vol. 60, no. 1, 2007, pp. 493-500. 
66
  Barbara Vis, “The Comparative Advantages of fsQCA ans Regression Analysis for 
Moderately Large-N Analyses”, Sociological Methods and Research, vol. 40, no. 1, 2012, 
p. 175. 
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The main aspects in which both methods differ are the way how these 
methods work with interacting effects, detect multiple paths (equifinality), and 
how they tackle limited diversity. Compared to regression analysis, QCA is 
better adapted to interpretation of an interaction consisting of more than two 
variables especially in medium-N comparisons67, which is the case of this study.  
In the way how they detect multiple paths (equifinality), both methods 
are different, because: 
 
“In regression analysis, if an outcome (dependent variable) occurs and the 
given cause (independent variable) does not, this counts as negative evidence for the 
strength of that causal relationship”68.  
“This means that the factor that influences the outcome in only a subset of 
cases – but some cases nonetheless – becomes invisible in regression analysis; in fact, it 
only inflates variance and deflates coefficients. Configurational comparative methods, 
contrarily, can identify the causal patterns that differ across subsets of cases, allowing 
for more complex causal narratives to be assessed”69. 
 
The last but important difference between these two methods is a 
limited diversity which is  
 
“a crucial issue for causal inference that, however, is usually overlooked both in case 
studies and statistical techniques. Diversity is limited when logically possible 
configurations of relevant conditions do not appear empirically70”71. 
 
While statistical methods are “inductively driven and focus on counterfactual 
estimation”72 and this problem is usually hidden from the researcher73 when working 
with QCA, the researcher must pay greater attention to this issue. 
On paper, researcher can choose one of three ways how to work with 
logical reminders74 (complex solution, parsimonious solution, intermediate 
                                                 
67
  Bear F. Braumoeller,‘‘Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms’’, 
International Organization, vol. 58, no. 4, 2004, pp. 807-820. 
68
  Jessica Epstein, Daniel Duerr, Lane Kenworthy, Charles Ragin, ‘‘Comparative 
Employment Performance: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis’’, in Lane Kenworthy, Method and 
Substance in Macrocomparative Analysis, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p. 68. 
69
  Barbara Vis, “The Comparative Advantages of fsQCA and Regression Analysis for 
Moderately Large-N Analyses“, 8th ESPAnet Conference, Budapest, 2010. 
70
  These cases are logical reminders (logically possible but empirically not observed 
combinations). 
71
  Claudius Wagemann, Carstern Q. Schneider, “Reducing Complexity in Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA): Remote and Proximate Factors and the Consolidation of 
Democracy”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 45, no. 5, 2006, p. 757. 
72
  Barbara Vis, “The Comparative Advantages of fsQCA...cit.”, p. 174. 
73
  Claudius Wagemann, Carstern Q. Schneider, “Reducing Complexity in Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis...cit.”, p. 758. 
74
  As this is the first time QCA has been applied in this kind of research, we focus our 
attention only on the complex solution. This decision was motivated by an attempt to 
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solution). None of these solutions can solve a situation where we have a greater 
number of variables. In these situations, QCA usually produces solutions which 
are too complex or misleading75. With regards to this issue, the key problem in 
every QCA application is the variable selection. Currently, we have about eight 
ways how to solve this problem76. 
Because this study combines QCA with regression analysis, variables 
are chosen by their statistical significance (significance approach). Based on 
this assumption, QCA is rather a complementary method in this study. The 
model of regression analysis in this study is an ordinary least square regression 
analysis with the time series cross-section data. QCA is used in its fuzzy-set 
variation. Beside “classic” crisp-set QCA, the fsQCA goes beyond 0 and 1 
membership score and allows us to capture a degree of membership77. 
For this reason, every fsQCA analysis begins with calibration of 
conditions. For each condition, it is important to establish a threshold of full 
membership in the set (0.95), the threshold of full non-membership in the set 
(0,05) and cross-over point (0.5), that is, neither more in nor more out of a 
particular set. Because this study works primarily with interval variables, 
calibration was carried out by direct method of calibration, when data was 
standardized by z-score78. Exceptions are variables coalition and concurrent 
election, which are dichotomous. The minimum level of consistency which I 
use is 0.90, which is recommended for demanding consistency criteria79.  
 
Regression Analysis 
 
The results of statistical analysis in Table 3 demonstrate that some of the 
tested variables have an impact on the dependent variable. The first tested model 
contained only economic variables and was successful in explaining approximately 
0,42 of variance. The results of the first model show that only economic growth has 
a statistically significant influence on the margins of victory. If the GDP grows, the 
margins of victory are also greater. The effect of economic liberty is also 
                                                                                                                       
depict the existing interactions in as detailed way as possible. The use of intermediate 
solution is not possible, due to the insufficient state of theoretical knowledge in this field. 
75
  Edwin Amenta, Jane D. Poulsen, “Where to Begin a Survey of Five Approaches to 
Selecting Independent Variables for Qualitative Comparative Analysis“, Sociological 
Methods & Research, vol. 23, no. 2, 1994, pp. 23-25; Claudius Wagemann, Carstern Q. 
Schneider, “Reducing Complexity in Qualitative Comparative Analysis...cit.”, pp. 756-
759; Barbara Vis, “The Comparative Advantages of fsQCA...cit.”, p. 174. 
76
  Sakura Yamasaki, Benoít Rihoux, “A Commented Review of Applications”, in Benoít Rihoux, 
Charles C. Ragin, Configurational Comparative Methods...cit., pp. 125-130. 
77
  Charles C. Ragin, Fuzzy-set Social Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000. 
78
  Idem, Redesing Social Inquiry. Fuzzy Sets and Beyond, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2008, pp. 86-94. 
79
  Idem, “Core versus Tangential Assumptions in Comparative Research”, Studies in 
Comparative International Development, vol. 40, no. 1, 2005, pp. 10-11. 
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fundamental but statistically insignificant. The other economic variables are 
statistically insignificant, with the exception of mineral rent, which corresponded to 
the theoretical expectations. In contradiction to these expectations, the mineral rent 
negatively impacts the magnitude of margins of victory. 
 
Table 3 
Regression Analysis 
  1. 2. 3. 4. stepwise 
Wealth -0,357      
Itrade -0,268      
GINI -0,15      
Grow 0,617    0,285 
Rent -0,281      
EcFree -0,503      
concurre.  -0,522   -0,299 
Cycle  -0,044     
LegiStre.  0,206     
Corrup.  -0,008     
Ban   0,953  0,423 
Censor   0,552    
CSF   0,178    
Intimidi   -0,472    
Boycott    0,198   
Coalition    -0,709 -0,529 
Protests    -0,295   
N 30 30 30 30 30 
Adj. R2 0,42 0,276 0,63 0,6 0,771 
Shaded coefficients = statistically significant (p ≤ .15)80. 
 
The institutional variables (model 2) succeeded in explaining 0,27 of 
variance. The effect of corruption and cycle is almost non-observable. 
Legislative strength then impacts margins of victory, but in the opposite 
direction than the theoretical expectation supposed. What is more, the effect is 
not statistically significant. The most influential institutional factor that is at the 
same time statistically significant are the concurrent elections. If the elections 
are concurrent, the margins of victory decline. 
Strategic decisions on the part of the government (model 3) explain 
0,63 of variance, which represents the best results of all tested models. Apart 
from freedom of civil society organizations, which has small and statistically 
insignificant effect on the dependent variable, the other 3 variables show great 
and statistically significant influence. The effect of party ban and censorship 
then corresponds to the theoretical expectations. An interesting situation 
                                                 
80
  The chosen level of statistical significance may seem strange, but it is the same level that 
Schedler used in his most recent book. The choice is thus motivated by an effort to allow 
the easiest possible comparison of the respective findings.  
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emerges in case of intimidation of opposition candidates and parties because 
this strategy negatively influences the magnitude of margins of victory. 
In the last separate model, effects of certain kinds of opposition 
strategies are presented. The model explains 0,6 of variance. All variables meet 
the theoretical expectations. However, only the effect of pre-election coalition 
of opposition parties is statistically significant. These results thus corroborate 
the empirical findings of Howard and Roessler81 about the fundamental role of 
opposition coalitions and pre-electoral oppositional protests (although in this 
study, this effect is not statistically significant) for the margins of victory. 
The last model combines the variables that turn out statistically 
significant on the basis of the previous stepwise analysis. The model is 
successful in explaining 77% of variance using only four variables. This means 
that these variables are highly relevant for explaining the margins of victory in 
the analyzed cases. The influence of all the variables has declined but has 
maintained the same direction. The coalition variable then demonstrates the 
smallest decline and at the same time the biggest effect on the dependent variable. 
 
 
FsQCA Analysis 
 
The first step of a fuzzy-set analysis is always a test for necessity (Table 
4). In our case, the results show that with a consistency level of 0.93, absence of 
coalition of opposition forces is a necessary condition for the presence of large 
margin of victory. The necessity test for the absence of large margin of victory 
yields no single necessary condition.  
 
Table 4 
Test for Necessity 
Outcome Big margin of victory Consistency Coverage 
Grow ~Grow 0,628 0,751 0,674 0,584 
Concurr ~Concurr 0,447 0,552 0,336 0,623 
Ban ~Ban 0,626 0,711 0,787 0,5 
Coalition ~Coalition 0,064 0,935 0,124 0,55 
Outcome Small margin Consistency Coverage 
Grow ~Grow 0,561 0,75 0,731 0,71 
Concurr ~Concurr 0,725 0,274 0,663 0,376 
Ban ~Ban 0,416 0,86 0,636 0,422 
Coalition ~Coalition 0,372 0,627 0,875 0,449 
Note: ~absence of condition; shaded coefficients=level of consistency 0,9 or bigger. 
 
The result of the complex solution (Table 5) shows that a membership 
in the set of large margin of victory is connected to two combinations of 
conditions. What they have in common is the absence of an opposition 
coalition. In the first case, we are dealing with a situation in which the 
                                                 
81
  Marc M. Howard, Philip G. Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes...cit.”. 
Electoral Competitiveness in Competitive Authoritarianism 347 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVII  no. 2  2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
opposition can freely participate in elections, but it is not unified. Real examples 
of such conditions can be observed in parliamentary and presidential elections 
in Ecuador and Bolivia. In the observed period of time, both countries saw 
fragmented opposition standing against an incumbent with an unquestionable 
public support. These reasons likely led to the fact that there was no need to 
restrict the opposition’s participation on the elections in any way82. In the 
second case, the opposition is also fragmented, but in a situation without 
election concurrence and bad economic development.  
 
Table 5 
Complex Solution Explaining the Level of Electoral Competitiveness 
in Latin America 1990-2014 
Large margin of victory                                                                                  Coverage 
~Coalition * ~PartyBan           51% 
~Coalition *~Concurr *~Grow 17% 
Small margin of victory                                                                                  Coverage 
Coalition *~PartyBan *~Grow 8% 
~PartyBan *~Grow *Concurr 36% 
 
This combination is a very interesting one, since it suggests that bad 
economic development is not by itself a factor that would start big changes. An 
example of this combination is the parliamentary election in Peru in 1992, when 
Alberto Fujimori managed to win despite a downward economic trend. 
However, what also played a significant role in Peru was the fact that the party-
system was in a serious crisis and traditional political parties faced a major lack 
of trust of the voters83. For a small margin of victory, there are also two 
combinations. The first one, which is relatively scarce among the analyzed 
cases (8%), confirms all the theoretical assumptions and its characteristic 
feature is the presence of both the opposition coalition and an unsatisfactory 
economic development. The parliamentary election in Venezuela in 2010 can 
serve as a good example84. The second combination confirms the importance of 
election concurrence and poor economic condition. The presidential election in 
Peru in 2000 falls into this category, as the difference between the winner ‒ 
Alberto Fujimori ‒ and the strongest opposition candidate was mere 9% of the 
                                                 
82
  For more information about both of these states, see Antonio R. Mayorga, “Populismo 
autoritario y transición regresiva: la dictadura plebiscitaria en la región andina”, Latin 
American Review of Comparative Politics, vol. 1, no. 2, 2017, pp. 39-69. 
83
  Bruce H. Kay, “‘Fujipopulism’ and the Liberal State in Peru, 1990-1995”, Latin American 
Politics and Society, vol. 38, no. 4, 1996, pp. 99-132. 
84
  Javier Corrales, Manuel Higaldo, “El regimen híbrido de Hugo Chávez en transicíon 
(2009-2013)”, Desafíos, vol. 25, no. 1, 2013, pp. 45-84. 
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votes. However, we need to take into account the fact that this particular 
opposition candidate (Alejandro Toledo) was supported by a relatively broad 
opposition coalition85. 
Although the fuzzy-set QCA doesn’t offer explanations to all cases, the 
coverage of the individual solutions stands between 51% and 17% of the 
empirical reality with large margins of victory and 8%-36% with small margins 
of victory, which means that the coverage measure is fairly comparable to the 
level of explained variance, such as R2, used in ordinary statistics. Additionally, 
fuzzy-set analysis also supports the results of the statistical test, as it confirms 
the assumption that the absence of opposition coalition leads to low electoral 
competitiveness in competitive authoritarianism. But at the same time, it also 
shows that the presence of opposition coalition is not necessary to the point of 
being irreplaceable for reaching a higher rate of electoral competitiveness. 
These findings thus partially disprove the conclusions of the dominant research 
in this field, which mostly focuses on the condition of the opposition86. In 
contrast, fuzzy-set analysis also brings forward the impact of the poor 
economical development, which has so far been rather de-emphasized in 
various researches on elections in hybrid regimes.  
 
 
A Replication Test With the Control Sample 
 
Since a relatively low number of cases (N 30) is one of the 
shortcomings of the presented analysis, a test of the same variables was carried 
out on a control sample (N 41) in order to reach a higher validity. The results of 
the statistical test in the Table 4 mostly confirm the conclusions of the first test. 
 
              Table 6 
Regression Analysis for Control Sample 
  5. 6. 7. 8. stepwise 
Wealth -0,231      
Itrade -0,123      
GINI 0,191      
Grow 0,448    0,264 
Rent -0,109      
EcFree -0,314      
                                                 
85
  Julion F. Carrión (ed.), The Fujimory Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in 
Peru, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 2006. 
86  Marc M. Howard, Philip G. Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes...cit.”; Valerie Bunce, 
Sharon Wolchick, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders...cit. 
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concurre.  -0,289   -0,059 
Cycle  -0,169     
LegiStre.  0,161     
Corrup.  0,193     
Ban   0,8  1,278 
Censor   0,706  0,528 
CSF   0,092    
Intimidi   -0,312    
Boycott    0,22   
Coalition    -0,512 -0,123 
Protests    0,14   
N 41 41 41 41 41 
Adj. R2 0,275 0,075 0,538 0,34 0,71 
Shaded coefficients = statistically significant (p ≤ .15). 
 
After adding more cases, the model composed of entirely economic 
variables (model 1) can explain a little over 27% of the variance. This is a 
smaller explanatory potential than what this model had in the main sample of 
this study, but the direction and impact of most variables remained the same. 
Again, only economic growth proved to have the biggest and statistically 
significant impact. The only change from the first model appeared with social 
inequalities, the impact of which changed from slightly negative to slightly 
positive. However, the impact is neither significant nor notably high. The 
results of the institutional model (5) differ from the first sample. In the new 
sample, these variables don’t seem very important, as they only explain 7% of 
the variance, which is rather little. The direction of the relationship between the 
variables was preserved, but neither variable is statistically significant anymore 
and the impact of election concurrence dropped to almost half its previous 
value, compared to the first model. 
The government strategies contained in the third model keep their high 
explanatory potential, being able to explain 54% of the variation only by 
themselves. Just like in the first sample, three variables are statistically 
significant. The only difference from the first model is a surge in the importance 
of censorship. The strategies of the opposition can only explain 0.34 variance 
and again, the coalition of the opposition is the most important factor. It is 
interesting to see a change of the link between the dependent variable and social 
protests. In the greater sample, the correlation becomes positive, on the contrary 
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to the theoretical expectations. However, the rate is low, which is why we 
should not attribute too much importance to this feature. 
The stepwise model saw a slight increase in the number of variables, 
from four to five, and it explains 71% of the variance, which is very solid. In 
addition to the four variables from the first sample, censorship was added ‒ its 
impact in the first sample being important, but not significant. On the whole, we 
can assert that despite the considerably lower impact of election concurrence, 
the results of this test confirm the conclusions of the first test. No variable was 
dropped from the stepwise analysis and we also didn’t see a significant change 
of relationship between any of the important variables. 
 
Table 7 
Test for Necessity for Control Sample 
Outcome Big margin of victory Consistency Coverage 
Grow ~Grow 0,706 0,68 0,764 0,637 
Concurr ~Concurr 0,554 0,445 0,439 0,61 
Ban ~Ban 0,694 0,705 0,822 0,614 
censor ~censor 0,74 0,659 0,746 0,658 
Coalition ~Coalition 0,124 0,875 0,254 0,581 
Outcome Small margin Consistency Coverage 
Grow ~Grow 0,609 0,78 0,654 0,725 
Concurr ~Concurr 0,714 0,747 0,56 0,74 
Ban ~Ban 0,554 0,84 0,65 0,731 
censor ~censor 0,655 0,747 0,656 0,74 
Coalition ~Coalition 0,364 0,635 0,744 0,418 
Note: ~absence of condition; shaded coefficients=level of consistency 0,9 or bigger. 
 
The FsQCA analysis of a larger sample shows that the tests for 
necessity (Table 7) yield no single necessity condition for either of the two 
solutions. However, it should be noted that in the test for negative outcome (low 
electoral competitiveness), the coefficient of the variable coalition is only very 
slightly below the requisite threshold of (0,9), standing at 0,87.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electoral Competitiveness in Competitive Authoritarianism 351 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVII  no. 2  2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Complex Solution Explaining the Level of Electoral Competitiveness 
in Latin America 1990-2014 for Control Sample 
Big Margin of victory 
~PartyBan *~Coalition *censor 19% 
~PartyBan *~Coalition *~Concurr *grow 1% 
~PartyBan *~Coalition *~grow *Concurr 1% 
PartyBan *~grow *~Coalition *~Concurr 14% 
Small margin of victory 
censor *~Coalition *~grow *Concurr 36% 
censor *Coalition *~grow ~PartyBan 16% 
 
A comprehensive solution for large margins of victory shows four 
possible ways. The individual combinations are more complicated to interpret, 
but what they all have in common is the absence of opposition coalition. The 
solution for small margins of victory shows two different ways. On the whole, 
the results of this analysis mostly confirm the trends set by the first test. Again, 
we can see the undeniable effect of some of the contextual factors and the 
specific impact of the opposition coalition. However, media censorship turned 
out to be a surprising factor. Based on theoretical assumptions, it should lower 
electoral competitiveness, but paradoxically, media censorship was present in 
all the cases where electoral competitiveness was relatively high. In the second 
solution, where media censorship is present together with an opposition 
coalition, we can assert that its impact will be lower due to the unity of the 
opposition. But the first case shows that election concurrence and bad economic 
results can somewhat weaken the influence of censorship even in the absence of 
opposition coalition. The results are thus in line with the conclusions of older 
studies which point to the relatively insignificant effect of media censorship and 
the lack of one particular omnipotent repressive strategy87. Still, we should be 
cautious when dealing with these findings, since the presented solutions cover 
only a smaller part of the empirical reality. Compared to the first sample, the 
fuzzy-set analysis can explain a bigger part of cases with low electoral 
competitiveness, while in the first sample, it was exactly the other way round.  
 
 
Conclusion and Implications for Future Research 
 
The aim of this study is to enrich the contemporary debate about 
electoral competitiveness of authoritarianism by testing the up-to-date findings 
                                                 
87
 Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty...cit., p. 223. 
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on the cases in Latin America, thus coming up with explanations that would 
better reflect the empirical reality of the analysed cases. Based on a combination 
of statistical analysis and set-theoretic analysis, we can say that it is possible to 
explain the examined problem in a fairly satisfactory way with only a few variables. 
Many previous studies saw the main causes of varying degree of 
electoral competitiveness in key decisions made by the opposition and the 
government. However, in the context of Latin America, some of the structural 
factors also turned out to be significant, the most important one being the 
positive impact of economic growth on the size of the margins of victory. These 
findings are consistent with the broader theoretical expectations, but ‒ 
paradoxically ‒ contradict the conclusions of other researches on elections in 
competitive authoritarian regimes. According to the majority of studies in this 
field, the impact of economic growth on the result of elections is rather 
insignificant88. The only exception to this trend is the research carried out by 
Schedler, who claims this variable to be important, but in the opposite direction 
to what the theoretical premises assume. Schedler’s research shows that 
economic growth rates seem to embolden the opposition89. The second 
significant factor seems to be the concurrence of presidential and parliamentary 
elections, which ‒ conversely ‒ decreases the rate of margins of victory. 
However, we know little about what the causal link between this variable and 
the dependent variable looks like, which is why this issue could prove to be an 
interesting aim of another qualitative research. 
Strategic decisions of governments and the opposition, which previous 
researches mark as having a notable impact on the elections, seem to be 
important also in the context of Latin America, but several geographical 
specifics need to be taken into account. First, some repressive measures adopted 
by governments have a statistically significant impact on the scope of electoral 
competitiveness. This conclusion is in contrast with the results of an older 
research by Schedler90, in which these measures appear to be statistically 
significant only in the case of hegemonic electoral regimes. A second 
conclusion regarding these strategies is that more public forms of repression, 
such as intimidation of opposition representatives, are counter-productive, 
which is why, at least in Latin America, choosing less visible forms of 
restrictions of electoral competitiveness is a more meaningful approach for the 
government. The only aspect which ‒ contrary to the theoretical assumptions ‒ 
doesn’t affect the scope of electoral competitiveness in a significant way, is the 
degree of freedom of civil society organizations. This finding confirms ‒ on a 
                                                 
88
  Marc M. Howard, Philip G. Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes...cit.”, p. 375; 
Daniela Donno, “Elections and Democratization...cit.”, p. 39; Leah Gilbert, State 
Mobilization Strategies...cit., p. 121. 
89
  Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty...cit., p. 244. 
90
  Ibidem. 
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larger sample size from Latin America ‒ the prior findings of authors who came 
to the conclusion that a high degree of freedom of civil society organizations 
doesn’t necessarily by itself have to be an issue for the government, since some 
organizations can actually help mobilize the public to support the 
representatives of the regime91. 
As laid out by the theoretical premises, the most important factor 
regarding the opposition is its unity. However, it is important to point out that 
while the inability of the opposition to form a broad electoral coalition can be 
seen as the key cause of low electoral competitiveness, it doesn’t necessarily 
mean that the existence of such broad coalition automatically leads to high 
electoral competitiveness. In cases of high electoral competitiveness, the 
situation tends to be more complex: this study suggests that in addition to the 
existence of a broad electoral coalition, other variables play an important role as 
well: the above mentioned institutional factors such as short-term economic 
indicators and ‒ above all ‒ the aforementioned concurrence of elections. The 
concurrence of parliamentary and presidential election can, by itself or 
combined with other factors, lead to a high degree of electoral competitiveness 
even in situations in which the opposition is divided. However, one very 
positive outcome is the fact that the presented schemes can often explain as 
much as twice the variance, compared to previous models, which means that 
this study significantly expands our ability to understand electoral 
competitiveness in competitive authoritarianism in Latin America. 
The fact that these findings are, to a big extent, based on so far unused 
data from “Varieties of Democracy” as well as some more recent cases of 
competitive authoritarianism raises the question whether the observed patterns 
are specific for elections in these particular regimes and only valid for Latin 
America, or whether these are trends that set apart the current cases of 
competitive authoritarianism from the ones in the past. Another question linked 
to the conclusions of the study is, understandably, what the development could 
be in the future. If the public and violent forms of pre-election repressions of the 
opposition turn out to be ineffective, does it mean that in the future, we will be 
able to witness the expansion of more sophisticated ways of influencing the 
public, such as censorship or other more elaborate forms of propaganda? How is 
the growing accessibility of the internet (and thus independent media) going to 
affect these strategies? Is it more effective not to write about the political 
opponents at all or to spread deliberate falsehoods about them? Can good timing 
affect the resulting success rate of these steps? The finding about how 
concurrent elections affect electoral competitiveness (the fact that it is much 
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harder for the opposition to win elections that are not concurrent) is an 
important one for the opposition’s effort to improve the chances of defeating the 
incumbents in competitive authoritarianism. At the same time, it should shift 
our attention towards a more in-depth analysis of the pre-election strategies 
used by these regimes.  
 
 
 
